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DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE AT 
THE INTERSECTION OF PROPERTY 
AND CONTRACT 
GIUSEPPE DARI-MATTIACCI* & CARMINE GUERRIERO† 
In this Article, we study rules that solve the conflict between the original 
owner and an innocent buyer of a stolen or embezzled good. These rules 
balance the protection of the original owner’s property and the buyer’s 
reliance on contractual exchange, thereby addressing a fundamental legal 
and economic trade-off. Our analysis is based on a unique, hand-collected 
dataset on the rules in force in 126 countries. Using this data, we document 
and explain two conflicting trends. There is a large amount of first-order 
divergence: both rules that apply to stolen goods and those that apply to 
embezzled goods vary widely across countries. Yet, there is also remarkable 
second-order convergence: virtually all legal systems protect the innocent 
buyer more strongly if the good was embezzled (rather than stolen) and if 
she purchased it in an open market, at an auction, or from a professional 
seller (as opposed to a private sale). We show that, while divergence is 
attributable to varying cultural values, convergence can be rationalized 
using a classic functional approach: these rules harmonize the owner’s 
incentives to protect property and the buyer’s incentives to inquire about 
title. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most legal systems around the world simultaneously advance two 
fundamental goals: the protection of property and the reliability of 
contractual exchange.1 When stolen or embezzled personal property is sold 
to an innocent buyer, however, one of them needs to be prioritized over the 
other. This problem, which we call the “property-contract balance,”2 arises 
because the thief or the embezzler commonly cannot be found or is insolvent. 
Therefore, we face the dilemma of either returning the property to the 
original owner—thereby frustrating the buyer’s contractual expectations—
or upholding the transfer—thereby undermining the security of ownership.3 
The rules addressing this issue—that is, good-faith purchase (“GFP”) 
rules—are as old as law itself. They can be found in the code of Hammurabi, 
the Talmud, Greek law, and Roman law, and Hindustani law, and they 
epitomize the pervasive phenomenon of transfers through (possibly 
unfaithful) intermediaries such as brokers, gallerists, middlemen, agents, and 
Internet platforms. Unauthorized agency, forged financial instruments, and 
double sales of personal or real property all raise analogous, GFP-like 
 
 1. This notion is central to the large literature in law and economics that has originated from R. 
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. ECON. 1 (1960). Its importance, however, had long been 
recognized in legal scholarship, not only in the United States. E.g., Gaetano Petrelli, L’Autenticità Del 
Titolo Della Trascrizione Nell’Evoluzione Storica e Nel Diritto Comparato, 53 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO 
CIVILE 585, 588 (2007); J.G. Sauveplanne, The Protection of the Bona Fide Purchaser of Corporeal 
Movables in Comparative Law, 29 RABEL J. COMP. INT. PRIV. LAW 651, 651 (1965). See generally RENÉ  
DEMOGUE, LES NOTIONS FONDAMENTALES DU DROIT PRIVÉ : ESSAI CRITIQUE POUR SERVIR 
D’INTRODUCTION À  L’ É TUDE DES OBLIGATIONS (1911) (on the notion of static versus dynamic security); 
VICTOR EHRENBERG, RECHTSSICHERHEIT UND VERKEHRSSICHERHEIT: MIT BESONDERER RÜ CKSICHT 
AUF DAS HANDELSREGISTER (1904) (on the notion of certainty of rights versus certainty of transactions).  
 2. We introduced this notion in Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Carmine Guerriero, Law and Culture: 
A Theory of Comparative Variation in Bona Fide Purchase Rules, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 543 (2015) 
(dealing exclusively with stolen goods). 
 3. Ashton Hawkins et al., A Tale of Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable Balance Between the 
Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 49–50 
(1995); Menachem Mautner, “The Ethernal Triangles of Law”: Toward a Theory of Priorities in 
Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95, 95–96 (1991); see also Grant Gilmore, The 
Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1057 (1954) (stressing that the 
historical emergence of the doctrine of good faith purchase served a commercial purpose: enabling 
contracting parties to rely on market transactions without costly inquiries about title); Boris Kozolchyk, 
Transfer of Personal Property by a Nonowner: Its Future in Light of Its Past, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1453, 1454 
(1987) (focusing on the rule’s function of enabling transfers through market intermediaries); Daniel E. 
Murray, Sale in Market Overt, 9 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 24, 24–25 (1960) (arguing that the good faith 
purchase rules provide common sense solutions to a universal problem); Sauveplanne, supra note 1, at 
651–52 (stressing the commercial logic behind good faith purchase rules). For a formal analysis, see 
Benito Arruñada et al., Property Rights in Sequential Exchange, 35 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127, 127–28 
(2019). 
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problems.4 
The perplexing normative question of how such cases should be 
adjudicated is the object of an important and vast scholarship. 5  In this 
Article, we are concerned with the positive question of how such cases are 
adjudicated in different countries around the world, and if trends emerge, 
how such trends can be rationalized. In the analysis, we employ a unique 
dataset on the GFP rules in force in 126 countries around the world.6 
To start with, we show that there is a large amount of first-order 
divergence across legal systems and quantify these differences using various 
indicators. GFP rules vary widely across countries, both for stolen and 
embezzled goods. This finding puts to rest a lingering debate in the literature, 
which has been traditionally divided in two camps: those who argue that GFP 
rules—and more generally private law provisions—vary,7 as we show, and 
those who believe that they are rather uniform if one considers how such 
rules are applied in practice8 (we account for this in our study). 
Yet, we also show that there is remarkable second-order convergence—
thereby vindicating both camps’ contentions—on how the protection of 
owners and buyers varies as a function of the mode of expropriation (theft 
versus embezzlement) and the context of the transfer (commercial versus 
private): virtually all legal systems in our dataset afford more protection to 
 
 4. See Benito Arruñada, Institutional Support of the Firm: A Theory of Business Registries, 2 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 525, 534–54 (2010); Kenneth Ayotte & Patrick Bolton, Optimal Property Rights in 
Financial Contracting, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3401, 3402–04 (2011). This Article focuses on personal 
property; real property is subject to registration, which in turn has different effects under different national 
registration systems. For analysis on real property, see generally Carmine Guerriero, Endogenous 
Property Rights, 59 INT. REV. L. & ECON. 313 (2016). 
 5. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Laws of Good Faith Purchase, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1333–38 (2011) (providing a recent scholarly contribution to this field that 
contains a review of the relevant literature). 
 6. The raw data and a detailed description can be found in Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Carmine 
Guerriero, A Novel Dataset on Horizontal Property Rights in 126 Jurisdictions, 11 DATA BRIEF 557, 
559–60 (2017). We dropped Taiwan due to a coding error and hence reduced the sample size to 125 
countries for the purposes of this analysis. This change does not affect any of our main results since our 
proxy for the quality of legal enforcement is not observable for this jurisdiction. We thank Yun-chien 
Chang for having drawn our attention on this issue. 
 7. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 
16 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 45 (1987); John Henry Merryman, The Good Faith Acquisition of Stolen Art, in 
CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 275, 275–81 (John Jackson et al. eds., 
2008); Patricia Youngblood Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict of Laws in Litigation Between Original 
Owners and Good-Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 50 DUKE L.J. 955, 1006 (2001). 
 8. E.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Legal Disputes Over the 
Ownership of Works of Art and Other Collectibles, in ECONOMICS OF THE ARTS 177, 214–17 (Victor A. 
Ginsburgh & Pierre-Michel Menger eds., 1996). For a historical perspective, see also Murray, supra note 
3, at 50–52 (discussing how multiple legal systems across space and time have been similar). 
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the innocent buyer if the good was embezzled rather than stolen, or if the 
purchase occurred in a commercial setting (we distinguish among public 
markets, auctions, and professional sellers, both for stolen and for embezzled 
goods) as opposed to a private sale. A fitting illustration is provided by the 
theft rule9 versus the entrustment doctrine10 in U.S. law: the owner prevails 
against a good-faith buyer of a stolen good, while the buyer prevails if the 
good was embezzled and she purchased it from a professional seller. 
What explains these trends and how can they be reconciled? We use a 
combination of empirical analysis—which yields useful insights only if there 
is variation in the underlying data—and theoretical rationalization. We first 
address the question of divergence. In a previous study,11 we developed a 
metric for cultural differences across countries—somewhat arbitrarily called 
self-reliance—capturing two distinct and important features of a country’s 
cultural endowment: respect for others and regard for hierarchy.12 We show 
that a country’s degree of self-reliance accounts for divergence in GFP rules 
better than other measurable cross-country differences, including: random 
“disagreements,” the legal origins of a country’s current legal system, 
differences in political systems, and differences in religious beliefs.13 
Our previous study dealt with stolen goods, but here, we exploit for the 
first time the other half of the data: embezzled goods.14 Both analyses yield 
the same result: specific cultural traits are the root of comparative variation 
in private law rules and possibly beyond. In particular, we find that high 
levels of respect for others and low levels of regard for hierarchy—
corresponding to a high degree of self-reliance—are associated with stronger 
owner protections. We demonstrate this contention using direct survey data 
on cultural traits and then repeat the analysis using the features of a country’s 
language as instrumental variables that embed cultural traits.15 The survey 
 
 9. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991). 
 10. See U.C.C. § 2-403(2)–(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). For a constitutional 
perspective on the theft rule versus the entrustment doctrine, see generally Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., (Red) 
Elvis Has Left the Building: Did the UCC Legalize Theft? Constitutional Concerns Arising from the UCC 
Entrustment Clause, A Critical Analysis of Lindholm v. Brant, 13 APPALACHIAN J.L. 21 (2013). 
 11. Dari-Mattiacci & Guerriero, supra note 2, at 550; see also Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Carmine 
Guerriero & Zhenxing Huang, The Property–Contract Balance, 172 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL 
ECON. 40, 49, 60–61 (2016). 
 12. Self-reliance takes three possible values: high, if a country has high respect for others and low 
regard for hierarchy; low, if a country has low respect for others and high regard for hierarchy; and 
medium, in the residual cases (high or low levels of both respect for others and regard for hierarchy). 
Collapsing two cultural dimensions into a single variable has the advantage of allowing for direct 
visualizations of the results. 
 13. See infra Section II.A (providing details on these approaches and references). 
 14. Dari-Mattiacci & Guerriero, supra note 2, at 559–60. 
 15. See infra Section II.B. 
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data is contemporaneous to law and hence one cannot be sure there is a causal 
relationship rather than a simple correlation. Language, instead, does not 
often vary as a result of legal reforms and can be used as a stable indicator 
of hard-wired cultural traits.16 To explore a possibly interesting avenue for 
future research, we also repeated our tests using world-wide data provided 
in the recent article, The Moral Machine Experiment17 and spotted some 
interesting, though not very robust,18 correlations between law and morality. 
More specifically, value systems that put more weight on an individual’s 
status and seniority are associated with stronger owner protection. 
While our analysis yields insights into the causes of divergence, it also 
raises the question of how to rationalize (1) the relationship between legal 
divergence and cultural variation and (2) legal convergence. The literature 
has produced two main theoretical perspectives on the GFP problem. The ex 
ante−incentives approach emphasizes that the level of protection that the law 
affords the original owner versus the buyer has an effect on the parties’ 
incentives to reduce the likelihood of potential conflicts. Namely, it dampens 
the owner’s incentives to protect her property and reinforces the buyer’s 
incentives to inquire about title.19 Conversely, the ex post−value approach 
suggests that, since something has already gone wrong, the contested good 
should simply be assigned to the party that surely, or absent reliable 
information on private valuations, values the good the most.20 
Our analysis vindicates—again—both sides of the debate. We argue 
 
 16. See Chi-yue Chiu, Language and Culture, ONLINE READINGS PSYCHOL. & CULTURE, Mar. 
2011, at 1, 3–5 (providing a literature review on the effects of language on culture); Emiko S. Kashima 
& Yoshihisa Kashima, Culture and Language: The Case of Cultural Dimensions and Personal Pronoun 
Use, 29 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 461, 462 (1998) [hereinafter Kashima & Kashima, Culture and 
Language]; Emiko S. Kashima & Yoshihisa Kashima, Erratum to Kashima and Kashima (1998) and 
Reiteration, 38 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 396, 396 (2005); Sean Lee, Rethinking the Relationship 
Between Pronoun-Drop and Individualism with Bayesian Multilevel Models, 2 J. LANGUAGE EVOLUTION 
188, 192 (2017) (arguing that the associations between language and culture found by Kashima and 
Kashima may be driven by Indo-European languages); Amnon Lehavi & Amir Licht, BITs and Pieces of 
Property, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 115, 115–18 (2011) (first to use this approach in legal scholarship); Lewis 
Davis, An Extension of the Kashima and Kashima (1998) Linguistic Dataset 2–4 (May 12, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 17. See Edmond Awad et al., The Moral Machine Experiment, 563 NATURE 59, 60–64 (2018). 
 18. See infra Section II.B (explaining these findings vanish when one adds relevant controls).  
 19. See Levmore, supra note 7, at 46; Anthony Ogus, What Legal Scholars Can Learn from Law 
and Economics, 79 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 383, 394–95 (2004). For a formal mathematical approach to 
the problem, see generally Landes & Posner, supra note 8; Caspar Rose, The Transfer of Property Rights 
by Theft: An Economic Analysis, 30 EUR. J.L. ECON. 247 (2010); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 5; Omri 
Ben Shahar, Property Rights in Stolen Goods: An Economic Analysis (1997) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with authors). 
 20. Barak Medina, Augmenting the Value of Ownership by Protecting It Only Partially: The 
“Market-Overt” Rule Revisited, 19 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 343, 368 (2003). 
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that the value approach provides a useful theoretical framework to 
understand divergence. The intuition is that while it is in principle more 
likely that the buyer attaches more value to the contested good—because 
high-value buyers self-select into the market—the importance of ex post 
reallocations is affected by the prevalence of theft—which in turn depends 
on the level of respect for others—and the efficiency of the enforcement 
system—which is a function of the level of regard for hierarchy. 
In turn, we explain that the incentive approach sheds light on 
convergence. In a nutshell, stronger buyer protection emerges in contexts 
where the buyer has comparatively little control over the situation, and vice 
versa. In embezzlement cases, the owner can easily reduce the likelihood of 
expropriation by selecting a more trustworthy agent, which is not the case 
with theft cases. Similarly, in commercial transactions, there is a legitimate 
expectation that title has already been scrutinized, and hence, there is little 
the buyer can add.21 In contrast, in private sales, the buyer’s effort pays off.22 
We proceed as follows. In Part I we lay out the theoretical foundations 
of our approach, describe the data, and document convergence and 
divergence in GFP rules for stolen and embezzled goods. In Part II, we focus 
on divergence, show empirically that it is the product of cultural differences 
(in the degree of self-reliance), and compare our explanation with extant 
theories of comparative variation. In Part III, we address the issue of 
convergence and propose that, while the ex post−value approach elucidates 
divergence, the ex ante−incentives approach best accounts for convergence. 
 
 21. Several previous contributions have recognized the fact that the owner is in the best position 
to reduce the risk of embezzlement and that the buyer is justified in assuming the presence of good title 
in an open commercial setting. E.g., BENITO ARRUÑ ADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL 
EXCHANGE 41 (2012); Arruñada, supra note 4, at 528; Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency 
Law with Contract Theory, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1969, 1996–97 (1987); Karen Theresa Burke, International 
Transfers of Stolen Cultural Property: Should Thieves Continue to Benefit from Domestic Laws Favoring 
Bona Fide Purchasers?, 13 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 427, 444–46 (1990); Saul Levmore, Rethinking 
Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 TUL. L. REV. 235, 287 
(1986); Levmore, supra note 7, at 59; Mautner, supra note 3, at 131; Medina, supra note 20, at 346; 
Harold R Weinberg, Sales Law, Economics, and the Negotiability of Goods, 9 J. LEGAL. STUD. 569, 590–
91 (1980). 
 22. At a very general level, our analysis proposes a framework to rationalize divergence and 
convergence in private law rules, suggesting that divergence is driven by culture while convergence is 
driven by function—more precisely, the need to provide incentives for good behavior. For alternative 
frameworks used to addresss the same issue, see Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, Convergence and 
Divergence in Systems of Property Law: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 
786−96 (2019); Saul Levmore, Convergence and Then Downstream Divergence in Torts and Other Law, 
92 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 782−83 (2019); see also Yun-chien Chang, 214 Jurisdictions in the World Gets 
It Wrong: Fractional Ownership and Internal Auction in the Good-faith Purchase Problem 28–35 (2018) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (arguing that the market overt rule provides optimal 
incentives to owners, buyers, and intermediaries). 
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The Appendix contains details of the analysis and of the data collection 
process, additional figures and regression tables. 
I.  FIRST-ORDER DIVERGENCE AND SECOND-ORDER 
CONVERGENCE 
We focus on the regulation of the GFP for value without notice of 
personal property in the case of theft—in which the original owner was 
dispossessed by a thief—and embezzlement—in which the good was 
originally entrusted by the original owner to an (unfaithful) embezzler. 
Scholarship has traditionally been divided on the issue of divergence versus 
convergence in GFP rules.23 Traditional comparative analyses were based on 
only a handful of countries, often covered only blackletter law, and did not 
generally offer a way to compare the rules in force in different countries in 
an unambiguous and measurable way.24 
To overcome these challenges, we worked with 149 teams of property 
experts in 125 countries,25 who generously provided their time and effort to 
this project. Their names and the list of countries covered in this study can 
be found in the Appendix. These experts are either law professors at leading 
universities in their respective countries or practicing lawyers associated 
with internationally renowned law firms, most of which are part of the Lex 
Mundi network. We collected the data by means of a questionnaire in which 
we asked the question, “[a]t what conditions does a good faith buyer acquire 
ownership of a stolen or embezzled good?” and investigated a number of 
complementary and boundary issues.26 
We inquired about the specific rules that apply to GFP, the definition of 
good faith, whether good faith is presumed, whether compensation is due to 
the dispossessed good-faith buyer in case the owner successfully reclaims 
the good,27 the general background rules of adverse possession, transfer of 
 
 23. See supra notes 7−8 and accompanying text. 
 24. When we started collecting data for this project, the largest previous study on this matter only 
covered about thirty countries; for this information, see generally NATIONAL REPORTS ON THE TRANSFER 
OF MOVABLES IN EUROPE (Wolfgang Faber & Brigitta Lurger eds., 2011); RULES FOR THE TRANSFER OF 
MOVABLES (Wolfgang Faber & Brigitta Lurger eds., 2008). Recent comparative law scholarship 
increasingly makes use of large datasets and a series of notable studies on this matter have been produced 
by Professor Yun-chien Chang, whose work is complementary with ours. 
 25. Note that in the data we differentiate among England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. 
 26. The questionnaire was drafted by the two of us and Arthur Salomons and was sent to the 
country experts in English or French. 
 27. While a number of countries require the original owner to pay compensation to the good-faith 
buyer when the good is reclaimed, interestingly, no jurisdiction in our sample contained the opposite rule, 
which would require a prevailing good-faith buyer to pay compensation to the original owner in order to 
retain the good. 
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property and statutes of limitations, and which goods are excepted (such as 
cultural heritage) or registered (such as automobiles) and hence subject to a 
different set of rules. The data covers the period 1981–2011; there was no 
relevant reform over this period.28 Importantly, experts were instructed to 
report the black-letter rules and how they are applied in practice by courts. 
In order to obtain a comparable measure of the rules of interest in each 
jurisdiction, from the experts’ answers we distilled four variables indicating 
the number of years after which the good-faith buyer acquires title on the 
good in each of four situations: private sale, public market, auction, and 
professional seller. We repeated the same exercise twice: for stolen goods 
and for embezzled goods. (We focused on cases in which the good is 
immediately resold after theft or embezzlement.)29 These variables provide 
a quantitative measure of the protection of the original owner versus the 
good-faith buyer in each case: the greater the number of years, the stronger 
the protection of the original owner, and conversely, the weaker the 
protection of the good-faith buyer.30  
 
 28. The data is freely available in Dari-Mattiacci & Guerriero, supra note 6, at 559–60. For more 
details and extensive summary statistics, see Dari-Mattiacci & Guerriero, supra note 2, at 550−55. 
 29. We did so because statutes of limitations start running at different times in different 
jurisdictions. In this way, we made sure that our comparisons are not affected by this additional source 
of variation. 
 30. There are cases in which the buyer never acquires title (as reported in Table 1). We assigned 
to these cases the value of 30 years, which is the largest value short of “Never” in our data. We repeated 
the analysis with alternative proxies for “Never” and the results remain essentially the same. 
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TABLE 1.  Relative Owner Protection in the United States and Four 
Comparison Countries 
Country USA Denmark Turkey France Italy 
   Theft 
Owner protection in private 
sales (years) Never Never 5 3 0 
Pro-buyer liability rule in 
private sales No No No No No 
Owner protection in 
commercial transactions 
(public markets, auctions, 
and professional sellers) 
(years) Never Never 5 3 0 
Pro-buyer liability rule in 
commercial transactions 
(public markets, auctions, 
and professional sellers) 





   Embezzlement 
Owner protection in private 
sales (years) Never 0 0 3 0 
Pro-buyer liability rule in 
private sales No No No No No 
Owner protection in 
commercial transactions 
(public markets, auctions, 
and professional sellers) 
(years) 0a 0 0 3 0 
Pro-buyer liability rule in 
commercial transactions 
(public markets, auctions, 
and professional sellers) 
(years) No No No 
Purchase 
price No 
Notes: Relative owner protection in the United States and four comparison countries for stolen and 
embezzled movable goods as measured by the number of years after which the buyer acquires title. 
a For the United States the value is “0” with professional sellers and “Never” with public markets 
and auctions.  
Table 1 provides an example of the most relevant of the variables in our 
dataset for four countries as compared to the United States, and of the extent 
of variation. Starting from the top row, Denmark provides the strongest 
degree of owner protection in the case of stolen goods purchased in a private 
sale. In this case the buyer never acquires title, hence the owner is fully 
protected. (The “theft rule” in the United States provides the same degree of 
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protection.)31 At the other end of the spectrum, Italy fully protects the buyer, 
who acquires title immediately. Turkey and France afford the owner an 
intermediate level of protection, recognizing the buyer’s title after five and 
three years, respectively. None of these four countries require the owner to 
pay compensation to the buyer when the owner reclaims a good that the 
buyer purchased privately (second row). 
The third and fourth rows concern commercial transactions, in which 
the buyer purchased the good in a public market, at an auction, or from a 
professional seller.32 While the main index of owner protection is the same 
as in private sales, Turkey and France require the owner to pay a 
compensatory sum to the buyer equal to the market price and the purchase 
price, respectively, conditional on the owner satisfying the time limitation. 
Moving down the table, while France and Italy have uniform rules for 
stolen and embezzled goods, both Denmark and Turkey provide more 
protection to the buyer when the good was embezzled rather than stolen. The 
difference is particularly stark in Denmark, where owners are provided with 
full protection in the case of theft and buyers are provided with full 
protection in the case of embezzlement. (The buyer is fully protected in the 
United States under the entrustment doctrine if the embezzled good was 
purchased from a professional seller.)33  
 
 31. E.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991). 
 32. Note that the dataset differentiates among these three cases while the table does not, because 
the four countries reported here apply uniform rules, in contrast with the United States. See id. 
 33. See U.C.C. § 2-403(2)–(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). 
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FIGURE 1.  Theft versus Embezzlement (Private Transactions) 
 
Note: Relative owner protection for stolen and embezzled movable goods in private sales as 
measured by the number of years after which the buyer acquires title. (Sample size = 125). 
To illustrate one of the metrics we use, in Figure 1 we provide the same 
information as in the first row of Table 1 for all the countries in our dataset.34 
Each dot in the graph represents a different country. The position of the dot 
in the graph indicates the degree of owner protection for private sale; the 
degree of owner protection for embezzled goods is indicated on the 
horizontal axis and the degree of owner protection for stolen goods is 
indicated on the vertical axis. 
The countries that can be found along the diagonal afford the same 
degree of protection for stolen and embezzled goods (like Italy and France). 
Countries above the diagonal afford more protection to the owner if the good 
was stolen as opposed to embezzled (like Denmark and Turkey) and, vice 
versa, countries below the diagonal afford less protection to the owner if the 
good was stolen as opposed to embezzled. 
The figure shows a large degree of first-order divergence in GFP rules. 
Countries are widely spread out both along the vertical axis—implying 
variation in the GFP rules concerning theft—and along the horizontal axis—
which refers to embezzlement. Next to the two polar cases (full owner 
 
 34. For the list of country and country codes, see infra Appendix. 
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protection and full buyer protection), many countries offer several different 
intermediate degrees of protection to the owner, with a particularly relevant 
amount of variation in the range from zero to ten years. 
The figure also shows the extent of second-order convergence, which 
can be appreciated by comparing the rules for stolen goods with those for 
embezzled goods. With only a couple of exceptions, the vast majority of the 
countries in our dataset lie above the diagonal; that is, almost all countries 
afford more protection to the original owner when the good was stolen rather 
than embezzled. 
Analogous results are obtained when one considers the case of theft 
versus embezzlement in commercial transactions in Figure 2,35 and the case 
of private sales versus commercial transactions for both theft and 
embezzlement in Figure 3.  
 
 35. Note that there is less variance in commercial transactions, as compared to private sales. This 
observation is consistent both with a static push towards more buyer protection in commercial settings, 
which mechanically reduces variation and with a dynamic tendency towards convergence due to higher 
stakes and more frequent interactions. See Richard A. Epstein, The Path to the T.J. Hooper: The Theory 
and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15−16 (1992). 
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Note: Relative owner protection for stolen and embezzled movable goods in commercial 
transactions as measured by the number of years after which the buyer acquires title. (Sample 
size = 125). 
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FIGURE 3.  Private versus Commercial Transactions 
Note: Relative owner protection in private versus commercial transactions as measured by 
the number of years after which the buyer acquires title. (Sample size = 125). 
Table 2 shows the prevalence of buyer-compensation provisions. These 
provisions surface more often across commercial settings as compared to 
private transactions, which is consistent with a greater degree of buyer 
protection in commercial transactions. Likewise, with private transactions, 
buyer-compensation provisions are more common in cases of embezzlement 
as compared to theft. This is again in line with the fact that embezzlement is 
associated with more buyer protection. However, in commercial transactions 
the result is inverted: buyer-compensation provisions are more common with 
theft. Although apparently puzzling, this result can be rationalized by noting 
that, in all cases, the removal of the compensation requirement is 
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accompanied by a shorter term of years. This suggests a substitution effect: 
the reason for the lower prevalence of compensation rules is the fact that the 
buyer effectively received more protection. In the following sections, we 
delve into the causes of divergence and convergence. 
TABLE 2.  Prevalence of Buyer Compensation Rules 
 Theft Embezzlement 
Private transactions 15.6% 20.3% 
Commercial transactions (public markets, 
auctions, and professional sellers) 31.3% 28.9% 
II.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A.  THEORIES OF COMPARATIVE VARIATION AND THEIR EMPIRICAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
There are four main competing explanations for comparative variation 
that—given currently available data—lend themselves to empirical 
investigation. We introduce them in the following sections and emphasize 
their main empirical implications. 
1.  Functional Equivalence 
The functional-equivalence theory36 holds that different legal systems 
most often implement the same solutions when addressing similar problems, 
owing to an underlying commonality of aims. This implies that, as 
emphasized by Professor Saul Levmore,37 when differences in the laws of 
different countries are detected, they must be illusory (so that different rules 
actually reach the same outcome), accidental (rules differ for some random 
historical accident), or innocuous divergences of opinions (in cases when the 
optimal solution is unclear). 
We can exclude the instances when differences in GFP rules are 
illusory. We asked country experts in our pool to report on how the black-
letter law is applied in practice and to focus on the outcome of potential 
lawsuits. Differences remain and are substantial. If these differences are due 
to divergences in the way equally reasonable persons could assess the same 
issue, then they should not exhibit any particular pattern. If we detect a 
pattern in the data, we can then conclude that the functional-equivalence 
 
 36. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖ TZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 33–47 (Tony Weir 
trans., Clarendon Press 3d rev. ed. 1998). 
 37. Levmore, supra note 7, at 65. For further discussion, see generally Levmore, supra note 22. 
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theory cannot explain divergence (while, as we will see in Part III, it may 
successfully explain convergence). Differences due to historical accidents 
may instead follow a pattern due, for instance, to colonization or 
transplantation dynamics. We discuss this issue in Section II.A.3. 
2.  Culture 
Countries differ sharply in terms of dominant cultural values. In turn, 
cultural differences may result in differences in the law.38 Culture can be 
“measured” in various ways. Direct measurements are provided by 
questionnaires administered through world-wide surveys. 39  The problem 
with direct measurements of cultural differences is that they are 
contemporaneous to law and hence it is hard to determine whether the 
relationship is causal. Therefore, to inquire about the cause of comparative 
variation, one needs to look deeper and identify cultural traits in a way that 
is unlikely to be the product of private law rules or some hidden common 
cause. 
Language provides a relatively stable measure of deep cultural traits 
that—controlling for colonization, which codetermined law and language in 
many former colonies—is unlikely to be affected by private law. More 
specifically, pronoun usage embeds the way in which native speakers of a 
certain language relate to each other.40 On the one hand, some languages 
 
 38. See SJOERD BEUGELSDIJK & ROBBERT MASELAND, CULTURE IN ECONOMICS 313–18 (2011); 
GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS 23–24 (1991); DEEPAK LAL, UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES: THE IMPACT OF FACTOR ENDOWMENTS, CULTURE, AND POLITICS ON LONG-RUN 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 62–65 (1998) (noting the effect of culture on predominantly-Islamic 
countries); Philippe Aghion et al., Regulation and Distrust, 125 Q.J. ECON. 1015, 1046–47 (2010); 
Thorsten Beck et al.,, Law, Endowments, and Finance, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 137, 151–53 (2003); Yuriy 
Gorodnichenko & Gerard Roland, Culture, Institutions and the Wealth of Nations, 99 REV. ECON. STAT. 
402, 402−04 (2017); Jim Granato et al., The Effect of Cultural Values on Economic Development: Theory, 
Hypotheses, and Some Empirical Tests, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 607, 613 (1996); Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs 
and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist 
Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912, 914 (1994); Luigi Guiso et al., Does Culture Affect Economic 
Outcomes?, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 23, 44–46 (2006); Amir N. Licht et al., Culture, Law, and Corporate 
Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 229, 253 (2005); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption, in 1 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 517, 521 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Shalom 
H. Schwartz, A Theory of Cultural Values and Some Implications for Work, 48 APPLIED PSYCHOL. INT’L 
REV. 23, 25 (1999); René M. Stulz & Rohan Williamson, Culture, Openness, and Finance, 70 J. FIN. 
ECON. 313, 346 (2003); Guido Tabellini, Institutions and Culture, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 255, 255–59 
(2008); Claudia R. Williamson & Carrie B. Kerekes, Securing Private Property: Formal Versus Informal 
Institutions, 54 J.L. & ECON. 537, 564 (2011). 
 39. For an example of one of these world-wide surveys, Ronald Inglehart, World Values Survey 
wave 6 (2010−2014), INST. FOR SOCIAL RES. (2014), http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocument 
ationWV6.jsp. 
 40. See  PETER MÜ HLHÄ USLER & ROM HARRÉ , PRONOUNS AND PEOPLE: THE LINGUISTIC 
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL AND PERSONAL IDENTITY 16–18 (Peter Trudgill et al. eds.,1990); Kashima & 
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allow the speaker to drop the first-person pronoun. This rule de-emphasizes 
the individual in a conversation and is empirically associated with lower 
levels of trust and respect for others.41 On the other hand, some languages 
require the speaker to choose between the formal and the informal version 
of the second-person pronoun. This rule is empirically associated with higher 
levels of regard for hierarchy.42 Our self-reliance indicator captures both 
dimensions.43 
3.  Legal Origins 
Differences among legal systems can be traced back to a process of 
transplantation from one country to another.44 The legal-families theory in 
comparative law45 and the legal-origins theory in comparative economics46 
emphasize a particularly pervasive channel of transplantation: colonization. 
Empirically, this approach implies that divergence should be explained by 
common law rather than civil law origins; common law is associated a higher 
degree of private ordering in society, which in turn stresses owner 
protection.47 
Instead of relying simply on the identity of the colonizer in a distant 
past, we empirically identify a country’s legal tradition based on its current 
characteristics along five dimensions: the precedential value of appellate 
decisions, the possibility to appeal on questions of facts, the role of equity, 
 
Kashima, Culture and Language, supra note 16, at 461–64. 
 41. See GEERT H. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES 11–14 (Walter J. Lonner & John W. 
Berry eds., 1980) (classifying culture along the individualism-collectivism dimension). Italian, for 
instance, allows pronoun drop (low level of trust and respect for others), while English does not (high 
level of trust and respect for others). 
 42. See Shalom H. Schwartz, Beyond Individualism/Collectivism: New Cultural Dimensions of 
Values, in INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM 85, 98 (Uichol Kim et al. eds., 1994) (classifying culture 
along the hierarchy-egalitarianism dimension). Italian, for instance, allows the use of different second 
person pronouns modulated by social distance (widespread acceptance of hierarchy), while English does 
not (limited acceptance of hierarchy). 
 43. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 44. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 16–20 (Univ. of Ga. Press 2d ed. 1993); ALAN 
WATSON, ROMAN LAW & COMPARATIVE LAW 197 (1991). 
 45. See James Gordley, Comparative Law and Legal History, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 753, 761 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). 
 46. See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1131 
(1997) (defining modern legal origins as either English, French, German, or Scandinavian).  See generally 
Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. FIN. ECON. 653 (2003) 
(providing another example of legal origins); Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 
Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002) (same); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) 
(same). 
  47.  Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
285, 285−87 (2008). 
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the adversarial character of procedure, and the scope of oral evidence.48 This 
classification provides a continuous measure of proximity to a pure common 
law system, which in turn can be tested against self-reliance as a possible 
explanation for divergence. 
4.  Political Economics 
Politics may play an important role in determining a country’s private 
law institutions.49 In our context, the protection afforded to original owners 
versus good-faith buyers could be a function of the balance of power between 
an entrenched, concentrated elite, focused on protecting static ownership, 
and the rest of society. As a result, we should expect less democratic systems 
and systems based on majoritarian rather than proportional representation to 
reflect the preferences of the elite50 and tend towards higher levels of owner 
protection.51 
5.  Religious Beliefs 
Culture is heavily influenced by religious beliefs. Max Weber pointed 
out the effect of Protestantism on capitalist attitudes. He explained that, 
contrary to Catholics, Protestants saw worldly success as a sign of salvation 
and submitted to an ethics that discouraged expenditures to the benefit of re-
investment.52 A recent study has empirically documented the association of 
religion with an attitude towards the protection of capital. In particular, it 
 
 48.  Since many countries have undergone substantial reforms after colonization, classifying a 
country as a common law or a civil law jurisdiction by looking at the moment of colonization may be 
unwarranted. Carmine Guerriero, Endogenous Legal Traditions, 46 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 49, 67 (2016); 
Mariana Pargendler, The Rise and Decline of Legal Families, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 1043, 1043–47 (2012). 
In addition, identifying the legal tradition as the country of origin of the colonizers lumps together a 
number of factors that are difficult to disentangle from the notion of a legal tradition, such as business 
culture, language, religion, preference heterogeneity and inclusiveness of political institutions, as one of 
us documented in previous works. See Guerriero, supra, at 67. 
 49.  Clayton P. Gillette, Who Puts the Public in Public Good?: A Comment on Cass, 71 MARQ. L. 
REV. 534, 534–36 (1988); Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 460, 463 (2006). 
 50.  Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, 95 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1005, 1007 (2005); See Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and 
Politicians Matter, Economic Outcomes Don’t, 88 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 47, 48 (2013). 
 51.  In the analysis, we measure the level of democracy by the constraints on the executive as 
coded in the Polity IV dataset. Monty G. Marshall & Ted Robert Gurr, Polity IV Individual Country 
Regime Trends, 1946-2013, POLITY IV PROJECT (June 6, 2014), http://www.systemicpeace.org/ 
polity/polity4.htm. Please note that this website has since been updated and its data does not exactly 
match the data used by this Article. We also use data on the electoral systems from Lorenz Blume et al., 
The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating—and Extending—Persson and Tabellini, 139 PUB. 
CHOICE 197, 209–25 (2009). 
 52.  See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 108–11 (Talcott 
Parsons trans., Routledge 2005). 
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found higher levels of creditor protection to be associated with 
Protestantism. 53  Analogizing to the GFP problem, we should expect 
Protestantism to be associated with higher levels of owner protection.54 
B.  TESTING THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 
All of the theories of comparative variation illustrated in the previous 
Section are compatible with a certain degree of divergence in GFP rules but 
each yields different predictions as to the pattern of such divergence. While 
the functional-equivalence theory implies that divergence should manifest 
itself as random noise, all other theories, including ours, predict that 
divergence should follow a certain predictable pattern in response to changes 
in the country characteristics emphasized by the theory under examination. 
These theories taken together predict that owner protection should be 
greater in countries displaying a stronger culture of self-reliance, a legal 
system nearer to a perfect common law tradition, weaker constraints on the 
executive, a majoritarian rather than proportional electoral system, and a 
larger share of Protestants in the population. If any of these variables can be 
shown to explain a country’s GFP rules, then we can reject the functional-
equivalence hypothesis, which implies that none of them should be 
statistically significant. 
To compare the explanatory power of these theories we ran a regression. 
Figure 4 visualizes the main result of the analysis, depicting the effect of 
self-reliance on owner protection after controlling for the determinants of 
comparative variation suggested by the competing theories.55 The degree of 
a country’s self-reliance is measured on the horizontal axis, while the 
relevant owner protection indicator is measured on the vertical axis. A 
positively-sloped regression line indicates a positive effect of self-reliance 
on owner protection, and a steeper slope indicates a bigger effect. (Vice 
versa, a negatively-sloped line reveals a negative effect.) 
Self-reliance has a positive, large, and statistically significant (at the 1% 
level) effect on owner protection in the case of embezzled goods. This result 
 
 53.  Stulz & Williamson, supra note 38, at 315. 
 54.  To test the effect of religion, we use data collected by Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of 
Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222, 234–44 (1999). 
 55.  For the summary statistics of all the variables we use and the estimates of our regression, see 
infra app. The figure reports the residuals from regressing the variable of interest (for instance, owner 
protection in private sales, in the upper-left graph) on all explanatory variables and compares it with the 
residuals from regressing self-reliance on the same explanatory variables. Through this procedure, we 
capture the extent to which self-reliance explains owner protection after considering the effect of other 
variables. 
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holds for all market configurations and allows us to reject the hypothesis that 
divergence is random.56 
FIGURE 4.  Self-Reliance 
 
Notes: This figure shows the effect of a culture of self-reliance has on GFP rules for 
embezzled goods. The graphs plot on the vertical axis the protection of the original owner’s 
property of a good embezzled and then sold, respectively, through a private sale, in a public 
market, at an auction, or by a professional seller; and on the horizontal axis, the graphs plot 
the level of a culture of self-reliance. We eliminate from each variable the variation that is 
explained by legal origins, democracy, a majoritarian electoral system and Protestantism. The 
slope of each line is a coefficient obtained from regressing the property rights proxy on a 
culture of self-reliance and the other control variables, and it is significant at 1% or higher in 
each graph. See the Appendix for details. 
Similarly, Figure 4 reports the effect of a larger share of Protestants on 
owner protection, after controlling for all the determinants of comparative 
variation suggested by the competing theories (including self-reliance). In 
this case, the effect is smaller and negative, suggesting that a larger share of 
Protestants is associated with weaker owner protection. This result is 
 
 56.  A recent study has emphasized that the association between languages and culture is especially 
driven by Indo-European languages. See Lee, supra note 16, at 192. To make sure that our results are not 
affected by this potential problem, we repeated the analysis with countries speaking only Indo-European 
languages and found the same results. The sample size, though, is severely reduced, limiting the 
possibility of running additional tests. See the Appendix for details. 
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inconsistent with the Weberian view that we mentioned before. Moreover, 
as documented in the Appendix, the coefficients attached to Protestantism 
are statistically significant at a 5% level only in the two upper graphs and in 
the bottom-left graph in Figure 5. 
FIGURE 5.  Protestantism 
 
Notes: This figure shows the effect of Protestantism on GFP rules for embezzled goods. The 
graphs plot on the vertical axis the protection of the original owner’s property of a good 
embezzled and then sold, respectively, through a private sale, in a public market, at 
an auction, or by a professional seller; and on the horizontal axis, the graphs plot a measure 
of Protestantism. We eliminate from each variable the variation that is explained by a culture 
of self-reliance, legal origins, democracy and a majoritarian electoral system. The slope of 
each line is a coefficient obtained from regressing the property rights proxy on Protestantism 
and the other control variables, and it is significant at 5% or more only in the two upper graphs 
(private sale and public market) and the bottom-left graph (auction). See the Appendix for 
details. 
Similar tests on the effects of constraints on the executive, a 
majoritarian rather than proportional electoral system, and the common law 
tradition return coefficients that are statistically undistinguishable from zero. 
These results demonstrate that divergence in GFP rules for embezzled goods 
is best explained by cultural differences rather than randomness, a common 
rather than civil law origin, political economics, or religious beliefs. These 
results are in line with our previous study in which we focused on stolen 
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goods and found the same pattern.57 (We also ran a series of regressions—
including widely used controls, related to income, natural resources, genetic 
variation and conflicts—and report the results in the Appendix.) 
Since our analysis stresses the role of cultural and religious beliefs, 
moral beliefs may also play a role. We thus ran an additional regression 
analysis on data from the recent article, The Moral Machine Experiment,58 
which classified countries based on moral beliefs, as exemplified in a modern 
version of the trolley problem: an autonomous car is about to crash on either 
one of two (groups of) people. Respondents were essentially asked who 
should die and who should be spared. We found an interesting positive 
correlation between the propensity to spare higher-status and older 
individuals in a country and owner protection in GFP rules in that country 
(Figure 6). While these results may make intuitive sense—given that the 
protection of property generally favors individuals belonging to the elite as 
opposed to the masses and older as opposed to younger individuals—their 
statistical significance vanishes when introducing relevant controls. Future 
studies may delve deeper into the empirical relation between law and 
morality.  
 
 57.  See Dari-Mattiacci & Guerriero, supra note 2, at 571−73. 
 58.  See Awad et al., supra note 17, at 60–64. 
  
2019] DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE 831 
FIGURE 6.  Morality 
 
Notes: This figure shows the effect of morality on GFP rules for embezzled goods. The graphs 
plot on the vertical axis the protection of the original owner’s property of a good embezzled 
and then sold in a private sale; and on the horizontal axis, the graphs plot the jurisdiction’s 
propensity to spare a high-status victim and that to spare a young victim, respectively. We 
eliminate from each variable the variation that is explained by a culture of self-reliance, legal 
origins, democracy, a majoritarian electoral system, and Protestantism. The slope of each line 
is a coefficient obtained from regressing the property rights proxy on each morality measure 
and the other control variables, and it is significant at the 10% level in the left graph (high-
status victim) and at the 1% level in the right graph (young victim). See Appendix for details. 
III.  CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN THEORY 
Scholarship on the topic has put forward two alternative frameworks to 
rationalize the choice between owner protection and buyer protection in 
GFP. One camp59 gives primacy to ex ante incentives to reduce the risk of 
unwanted transfers. In particular, the comparison is between the owner’s 
incentives to protect her property and the buyer’s incentives to inquire about 
title. The intuition is that protecting buyers provides owners with incentives 
to protect their property in order to reduce the likelihood of theft or 
embezzlement; conversely, protecting owners provides buyers with 
incentives to inquire about title in order to reduce the risk of paying for goods 
they will lose at a later time. 
An alternative approach is to focus on the ex post allocation of the good 
to the (most likely) higher-value user between the buyer and the owner.60 A 
useful heuristic is the fact that, typically, voluntary market transactions occur 
between a relatively high-value buyer and a relatively low-value owner. If 
the opposite were true, the transaction would not take place. Therefore, the 
potential buyers that populate a typical market are generally relatively high-
 
 59.  See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
 60.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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value individuals.61 Intermediaries tend to resell in those markets because 
the higher the buyer valuation, the greater their gains. In turn, dispossessed 
owners are not necessarily high-value individuals: some of them may never 
have sold the good while others might have in the future. Therefore, on 
average, the ex post conflict between the good-faith buyer and the original 
owner is most likely to involve a high-value buyer and an average-value 
owner. This in turn suggests that, in principle, ex post value is maximized in 
expectation if goods are assigned to the good-faith buyer.62 
A.  THE EX POST−VALUE THEORY AND FIRST-ORDER DIVERGENCE 
In previous studies, we have shown that country-specific characteristics 
affect the likelihood of ex post misallocation and, in turn, the relative 
desirability of buyer protection.63 Respect for others and regard for hierarchy 
are relevant for the regulation of GFP transactions. Countries with a higher 
level of enforcement benefit more from buyer protection and hence are more 
likely to adopt it. The intuition is that high levels of enforcement result in 
goods being returned to their original owners more often under owner 
protection, which makes buyer protection preferable. Conversely, countries 
with a higher degree of trust and respect for others benefit less from buyer 
protection because of a lower incidence of unwanted transfers. In this way, 
country characteristics can be used as an explanation for the GFP rules in 
force.64 
In terms of self-reliance, this analysis suggests that a higher degree of 
self-reliance—corresponding to higher levels of trust and respect for others 
and lower regard for hierarchy and enforcement—should be empirically 
associated with a higher level of owner protection.65 
 
 61.  This remains true even though owner of stolen or embezzled goods may attach low or high 
value to them. 
 62.  The desirability of buyer protection is only increased if one considers a potential feedback 
effect on prices. Buyer protection is likely to increase the resale price of stolen or embezzled goods, 
because buyers are willing to pay more if their title is more secure. In turn, the increase in price could add 
to the self-selection of buyers: higher prices discourage low-value buyers from entering the market, 
reinforcing our argumentation. 
 63.  Dari-Mattiacci & Guerriero, supra note 2, at 555−57; Dari-Mattiacci, Guerriero & Huang, 
supra note 11, at 15–16; Carmine Guerriero, Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and the Limits of the 
Market 3 (Dec. 4, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).  
 64.  See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 5, at 1372–73.  
 65.  This approach is in line with a related study by Professors Lehavi and Licht, who proposed 
individualism as a cultural feature explaining the protection of property. Lehavi & Licht, supra note 16, 
at 117–18 (explaining that self-reliance encompasses individualism through the pronoun-drop feature of 
the language as one of its two subcomponents). 
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B.  THE EX ANTE−INCENTIVES THEORY AND SECOND-ORDER 
CONVERGENCE 
The ex ante−incentives theories of GFP rules have traditionally been 
widely employed to construct normative arguments as to which rule is 
preferable on a global scale and have influenced scholarship more 
profoundly than the ex post−value approach.66 In turn, ex ante−incentives 
theories are premised on the idea that improved ex post protections dilute 
incentives ex ante. More specifically, increasing owner protection improves 
the buyer’s incentives to inquire about title but reduces the owner’s 
incentives to “self-protect” her property. 
However, this premise can be called into question in a dynamic market 
where prices adjust to expectations. If one allows the price that a buyer is 
willing to pay for a possibly stolen or embezzled good to reflect the risk that 
she will lose the good later on, the intuition illustrated above becomes far 
from obvious. While the literature has focused on the fact that legal 
protection affects the marginal benefits of self-protection, we argue that it 
also affects its marginal costs, making the result possibly indeterminate.67 
In particular, a higher level of owner protection has a direct effect on 
the incentives for the owner to protect her property because it increases the 
probability that a stolen or embezzled good will be returned and hence lowers 
the benefits from efforts to protect property. However, it also has an indirect 
effect. If the owner is protected, the market value of goods of dubious origin 
decreases (as buyers may be wary of losing the good later on), which reduces 
the expected gains of thieves and embezzlers, making them less aggressive 
at the margin. This in turn makes it cheaper for the owner to protect her 
property, thus creating an incentive towards more self-protection for the 
owner. Similarly, on the buyer’s side, owner protection increases the benefits 
of inquiring about title but also makes goods cheaper and, hence, lowers the 
cost of not doing so. 
Overall, the parties’ incentives may be positively or negatively affected 
 
 66.  In contrast, the literature on private takings originated from Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1089 (1972) which almost entirely focuses on the maximization of ex post value. The problem 
addressed in this literature is the maximization of the chance that the good ends up in the hands of the 
highest value user. When voluntary transactions fail this goal because of transaction costs, involuntary 
transactions (takings) may be tolerated. Differently from this literature, in a GFP situation the “taking” is 
effectuated by an intermediary (a thief or an embezzler) rather than directly by the taker (buyer, in our 
setup) and hence the transaction is always involuntary from the perspective of the owner and the buyer. 
See Dari-Mattiacci & Guerriero, supra note 2, at 555 & n.61. 
 67.  See generally Dari-Mattiacci, Guerriero & Huang, supra note 11, for a formal model of this 
trade-off. 
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by increased legal protection, weakening the power of the incentive-theory 
to explain the design of GFP rules for theft and embezzlement and, in turn, 
first-order divergence in GFP rules. We argue, however, that incentives can 
contribute to understanding second-order convergence in GFP rules. 
We start with comparing theft with embezzlement. The core of the 
argument is that for any given marginal benefit of self-protection for the 
owner, the marginal cost of self-protection for the owner is lower in the case 
of embezzlement than in the case of theft. The reason is intuitive: while 
thieves are strangers, an owner chooses whom to trust. In embezzlement 
cases, there are many ways the owner can protect her property, because most 
commonly she is in a (contractual) relationship with the potential embezzler 
and, hence, can both screen her counterparty ex ante and control her ex post. 
Therefore, comparatively, the owner has lower costs of care in 
embezzlement cases, while the buyer’s incentives to inquire about title 
remain unaffected. 
To stress our point, whatever effect owner protection has on the owner’s 
incentives to self-protect—and we have argued above that this effect is 
indeterminate—this effect is different in theft as opposed to embezzlement 
cases. In particular, the effect is comparatively more likely to go towards 
increased self-protection in the case of embezzlement. Convergence emerges 
as a second-order effect, when comparing the relative (a priori 
indeterminate) effect of legal protection in different setups.68 
A similar trend can be detected by comparing the rules that apply to 
private transactions with those pertaining to commercial transactions made 
in a market, at an auction, or through a professional seller. In the latter set of 
cases, buyer protection is systematically stronger. This is because the 
original owner’s ability to protect her property remains unchanged while the 
buyer’s ability to inquire about title may be far greater in private transactions 
as compared to commercial settings. In this case, information about title, 
whenever available, should have already been acquired by the intermediary 
so there is little scope for any additional buyer’s inquiry. It may therefore be 
preferable to attempt to incentivize the owner. 
 
 68.  We cannot exclude, however, that the ex post−value theory could also help explain differences 
between private and commercial sales and between theft and embezzlement in cases were transaction 
costs systematically vary across these environments. The interaction between the original owner and the 
intermediary, and the higher complexity of commercial environments might increase transaction costs 
and call for weaker original owners' property rights. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 66, at 1095–
97; Guerriero, supra note 63 (manuscript at 26–27). 
  
2019] DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE 835 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have documented first-order divergence and second-
order convergence in GFP rules around the world. Our empirical analysis 
shows that the most likely cause of divergence is cultural differences across 
countries, while a likely push towards convergence remains the functional 
uniformity of these rules. Of the two main theoretical approaches to GFP 
rules, we have shown that the ex post−value approach is well suited to 
rationalize divergence, while the ex ante−incentive approach explains 
convergence. While navigating the different camps that have polarized the 
debate on the normative and positive analysis of GFP rules, at the various 
junctures of our analysis we end up vindicating both sides of the debate and 
emphasize that different approaches contribute different layers of the theory 
we advance. Our conclusions do not imply that other factors are not at play. 
We have offered an exploratory analysis of the effects of morality, and future 
research may offer a more nuanced view.  
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APPENDIX 
A.  ADDITIONAL FIGURES 
FIGURE 7.  Democracy 
 
Notes: This figure shows the effect of democracy on GFP rules for embezzled goods. The 
graphs plot on the vertical axis the protection of the original owner’s property of a good 
embezzled and then sold, respectively, through a private sale, in a public market, at 
an auction, or by a professional seller, and on the horizontal axis the inclusiveness of political 
institutions (see Appendix). We eliminate from each variable the variation that is explained 
by a culture of self-reliance, legal origins, a majoritarian electoral system, and Protestantism. 
The slope of each line is a coefficient obtained from regressing the property rights proxy on 
Democracy and the other control variables, and it is never significant at 5% or higher. 
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FIGURE 8.  Majoritarian System 
 
Notes: This figure shows the effect of a majoritarian electoral system on GFP rules for 
embezzled goods. The graphs plot on the vertical axis the protection of the original owner’s 
property of a good embezzled and then sold, respectively, through a private sale, in a public 
market, at an auction, or by a professional seller, and on the horizontal axis the use of a 
majoritarian electoral system (see Appendix). We eliminate from each variable the variation 
that is explained by a culture of self-reliance, legal origins, inclusive political institutions, and 
religious beliefs. The slope of each line is a coefficient obtained from regressing the property 
rights proxy on Majoritarian and the other control variables, and it is never significant at the 
5% level or higher. 
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FIGURE 9.  Legal Origins 
 
Notes: This figure shows the effect of legal origins on GFP rules for embezzled goods. The 
graphs plot on the vertical axis the protection of the original owner’s property of a good 
embezzled and then sold, respectively, through a private sale, in a public market, at an auction, 
or by a professional seller, and on the horizontal axis the jurisdiction’s legal origins (see 
Appendix). We eliminate from each variable the variation that is explained by a culture of 
self-reliance, inclusive political institutions, a majoritarian electoral system and religious 
beliefs. The slope of each line is a coefficient obtained from regressing the property rights 
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B.  ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Table 3: Summary of Variables 
Variables Definition and Sources Statistics 
Pro-owner legal institutions: 
Property-Private-
E: 
Years after which the good faith buyer definitively acquires 







Years after which the good faith buyer definitively acquires 







Years after which the good faith buyer definitively acquires 







Years after which the good faith buyer definitively acquires 







Years after which the good faith buyer definitively acquires 







Years after which the good faith buyer definitively acquires 







Years after which the good faith buyer definitively acquires 







Years after which the good faith buyer definitively acquires 





Drivers of Property Rights 
Culture: 
First principal component extracted from the level of generalized 
trust and the importance of respect for other people self-reported 
to all the World Value Surveys and European Value Study up to 





First principal component extracted from the number of police 
personnel and the number of professional judges per 100,000 
inhabitants both averaged between 1973 and 2009. Source: United 
Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal 





Indicator variable which equals 3 if the language of the plurality 
group is such that the rule forbidding first person pronoun drop 
is not operative and the number of second person pronouns that 
might be used in spoken language does not vary according to the 
social proximity between speakers; 2 if the language has either 
one of the two features, and 1 otherwise. Source: Kashima and 
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Common-Law: 
Normalized first principal component extracted from the 
following variables coded for the year 2000: 1. Dummy for case 
law; 2. Dummy equal to one if only new evidence or issues of 
law can be reviewed, or if there is no appeal and zero if issues of 
both law and fact can be reviewed in appeal; 3. Dummy equal to 
one if judgment may be based on both law and equity grounds, 
and zero when they must be on law only; 3. Dummy equal to one 
if the evidence gathering procedure is adversarial and zero 
otherwise; 4. Dummy equal to one if the evidence is mostly 
submitted at oral hearings before the judge and zero otherwise. 





Executive constraints from the POLITY IV data set averaged 






Dummy variable for electoral systems, equal to 1 if the lower 
house in a country is elected under plurality rule, 0 otherwise. 
Only legislative elections (lower house) are considered. Source: 





Protestants as a share of the whole population in 1980. Source: 




Notes: a The first figure for each variable is the mean, whereas the second in brackets is the 
standard deviation; b Mean and standard deviation are calculated for the sample used in all 
the figures.  
 
 
TABLE 4.  OLS 
(1) (1) (2) (3) (4) 





























Adjusted R2 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.09 
# of  
   Observations 55 55 55 55 
Notes: a Standard errors in parentheses; b *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; 
**, 5%; *, 10%; c All specifications include a constant term. 
  





TABLE 5.  2SLS 
(4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 


































































P-value of  
   under- 
   identification 
   test 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Estimation 2SLS 
# of 
   Observations 55 55 55 55 
Notes: a Standard errors in parentheses; b *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; 
**, 5%; *, 10%; c All specifications include a constant term; d The null hypothesis of the 
Kleibergen-Paap test is that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the endogenous 
regressor. 
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TABLE 6.  Reduced Forms 
(7) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
























































Adjusted R2 0.14 0.23 0.16 0.14 
# of 
   Observations 55 55 55 55 
Notes: a Standard errors in parentheses; b *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; 
**, 5%; *, 10%; c All specifications include a constant term. 
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TABLE 7.  Reduced Forms with Extra Controls 
(10) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
























































Adjusted R2 0.26 0.31 0.24 0.29 
# of 
   Observations 55 55 55 55 
Notes: a Standard errors in parentheses; b *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; 
**, 5%; *, 10%; c All specifications include a constant term, genetic diversity, 2010 log of 
GDP per capita, intensity of external warfare, intensity of internal warfare, dummy for ex-
British colony, 2010 Crude oil proved reserves in US dollar per capita (more details on 
definitions and sources available upon request). 
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TABLE 8.  Reduced Forms with Extra Controls for Morality 
(13) (1) (2) (3) (4) 



















































































Adjusted R2 0.23 0.23 0.09 0.10 
# of 
  Observations 51 51 51 51 
Notes: a Standard errors in parentheses; b *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; 
**, 5%; *, 10%; c All specifications include a constant term. Legal, High-Status and Young 
capture respectively social preferences for law-abiding, high-status and young individuals 
obtained by the Moral Machine project (more details on definitions available upon request). 
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C.  LIST OF COUNTRY EXPERTS 
Besa Tauzi, Boga & Associates (Albania); António Vicente Marques 
and Cláudia Veloso, AVM-Advogados (Angola); Martín Bensadon, Marval 
O’Farrell & Marval (Argentina); Armen Melkumyan, Prudence CJSC 
(Armenia); Michael Back, Freehills (Australia); Wolfgang Faber, University 
of Salzburg (Austria); Rashid Aliyev, Baker & McKenzie, Baku, CIS 
Limited (Azerbaijan); Saifuddin Mahmood, Hassan Radhi & Associates 
(Bahrain); Al Amin Rahman and Sabrina Zarin, FM Associates 
(Bangladesh); Amina Khatoon, Doulah & Doulah (Bangladesh); Aliaksandr 
Danilevich, Belarusian State University (Belarus); Sergei Makarchuk, Law 
Firm CHSH Cerha Hempel Spiegelfield Hlawati, Minsk Office (Belarus); 
Caroline Cauffman, Maastricht University and University of Antwerp 
(Belgium); Tania Moody, Barrow & Williams (Belize); Mario Kempff and 
Patricio Rojas, CR & F Rojas Abogados (Bolivia); Meliha Povlakić and 
Darja Softić Kadenić, University of Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina); 
Rafael Gagliardi and Newton Marzagão, Demarest & Almeida Advogados 
TABLE 9.  Reduced Forms – Focusing on Indo-European Languages 
(16) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
























































Adjusted R2 0.20 0.22 0.14 0.12 
# of Observations 46 46 46 46 
Notes: a Standard errors in parentheses; b *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; 
**, 5%; *, 10%; c All specifications include a constant term. 
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(Brazil); Dimitar Stoimenov, Peterka & Partners Law Firm (Bulgaria); 
Camille Razalison and Adrien Rangira, John W Ffooks & Co (Burkina Faso 
and Ivory Coast); Jehny Ramiandrisoa and Adrien Rangira, John W Ffooks 
& Co (Burundi); Nimrod E Mkono, Gilbert LP Nyatanyi, Lambert Nigarura, 
and René-Claude Madebari, Mkono & Co. Burundi (Burundi); Eddy 
Ratianarivo and Adrien Rangira, John W Ffooks & Co (Cameroon); Matías 
Ignacio De Marchena Vicuña, Claro y Cía (Chile); Elliott Youchun Chen, 
Beijing Jun Ze Jun Law Offices, Shenzhen (China); Jie Chen, Jun He Law 
Offices (China); Ernesto Rengifo García, Universidad Externado de 
Colombia and Garrido & Rengifo Abogados (Colombia); Adrián Á lvarez 
Orellana, Consortium Laclé& Gutiérrez (Costa Rica); Eduardo Calderon, 
Adriana Castro and Manuel Santos, BLP Abogados (Costa Rica); Hano 
Ernst, University of Zagreb (Croatia); Tatjana Josipovic, University of 
Zagreb (Croatia); Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou, University of Central 
Lancashire (Cyprus); Alexandr Thöndel, Charles University (Czech 
Republic); Michaela Zuklínová, Charles University (Czech Republic); 
Arnauld Kayembe Tabu, University of Kinshasa and Kayembe Tabu Law 
Office Kinshasa (DRC) (Democratic Republic of Congo); Bukayafwa Deo 
Gratias, MBM-Conseil SCA (Democratic Republic of Congo); Francois 
Butedi, SADC-CNGO (Democratic Republic of Congo); Phebe Mavungu 
Clément, University of the Witwatersrand (Democratic Republic of Congo); 
Ole Borch, Bech-Bruun (Denmark); Tobias Vieth, Danders & More 
(Denmark); Laura Bobea Escoto, Medina & Rizek, Abogados (Dominican 
Republic); Pablo Ortiz-Garcia and Luis Marin-Tobar, Perez Bustamante & 
Ponce (Ecuador); Roque Albuja, Quevedo & Ponce (Ecuador); Ahmed El-
Gammal and Nihal Madkour, Shalakany Law Office (Egypt); Monica 
Machuca, Aczalaw (El Salvador); Kai Kullerkupp, University of Tartu 
(Estonia); Liina Linsi and Monika Tamm, Lawin (Estonia); Molla Mengistu, 
School of Law, Addis Ababa University (Ethiopia); Muradu A Srur, Addis 
Ababa University, School of Law (Ethiopia); Jarmo Tuomisto, University of 
Turku (Finland); Sophie Tavergnier and Philippe Xavier-Bender, Gide 
Loyrette Nouel (France); David Kakabadze, Georgian Legal Partnership 
(Georgia); Vanessa Pickenpack and Klaus Guenther, Oppenhoff & Partners 
(Germany); Ellen Bannerman, Bruce-Lyle, Bannerman & Associates 
(Ghana); Norma Dawson, Queen’s University Belfast (Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland); Ben McFarlane, University College London (Great 
Britain, Hong Kong and Malaysia); Alexandra Economou, Drakopoulos 
Law Firm (Greece); Cristóbal Fernández and María de la Concepción 
Villeda, Mayora & Mayora, S.C. (Guatemala); Juan José Alcerro Milla, 
Carolina Aguirre Larios and Melissa Amaya Pastrana, Aguilar Castillo Love 
(Honduras); Gabor Fejes, Oppenheim and Partners Freshfields Bruckhaus 
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Deringer (Hungary); Ciccu Mukhopadhaya and Surjendu Das, Amarchand 
Mangaldas and Suresh A. Shroff and Company, New Delhi (India); Nafis 
Adwani, Ali Budiardjo, Nugroho, Reksodiputro (Indonesia); Behrooz 
Akhlaghi, Shahrzad Majdameli, Encyeh Seyed Sadr, Camellia Abdolsamad, 
Ali Shahabi, Seyed Iman Mohamadian, Dr. Behrooz Akhlaghi & Associates 
(Iran); Caterina Gardiner, National University of Ireland, Galway (Ireland); 
Amnon Lehavi, Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) 
Herzliya (Israel); Alessio Greco, Istituto Mediterraneo per i Trapianti e 
Terapie ad Alta Specializzazione (Italy); Courtney B. Smith, Foga Daley, 
Attorneys at law (Jamaica); Hiroo Atsumi, Atsumi & Sakai (Japan); Bassam 
Abu-Rumman, Ali Sharif Zubi Advocates & Legal Consultants (Jordan); 
Dariya Saginova, Grata Law Firm (Kazakhstan); Saule Massalina, Salans 
law firm (Kazakhstan); Valikhan Shaikenov, Aequitas Law Firm 
(Kazakhstan); Peter Gachuhi, Kaplan and Stratton Advocates (Kenya); 
Atdhe Dika and Vegim Kraja, Kalo & Associates Law Firm (Kosovo); Al 
Noor, Al -Twaijri and Partners Law Firm (Kuwait); Babitskaya Elena 
Viktorovna, Veritas Law Agency Limited Liability Company (Kyrgyz 
Republic); Kanat Seidaliev, Grata Law Firm (Kyrgyz Republic); Nurlan 
Alymbaev, Law Firm Alymbaev (Kyrgyz Republic); Julija Kolomijceva, bnt 
Klauberg Krauklis Zab (Latvia); Tiisetso Sello-Mafatle, Sello-Mafatle 
Attorneys (Lesotho); Jaunius Gumbis, Lawin Lideika, Petrauskas, Valiūnas 
and partners (Lithuania); Simas Gudynas, Lawin Lideika, Petrauskas, 
Valiūnas and partners (Lithuania); Alex Schmitt, Bonn Schmitt Steichen 
(Luxembourg); Nenad Gavrilovic, Faculty of Law ‘Iustinianus Primus’, 
Skopje, University ‘Ss Cyril and Methodius’ (Macedonia); Fatima Diarra, 
Cabinet d’Avocats Sim (Mali); Jotham Scerri-Diacono, Ganado Advocates 
(Malta); Vincent Chong Leung, Juristconsult Chambers, cabinet d’avocats 
(Mauritius); Héctor Calatayud Izquierdo, Basham, Ringe y Correa (Mexico); 
Octavian Cazac and Vladimir Palamarciuc, Turcan Cazac Law Firm 
(Moldova); Nergui Enkhtsetseg, Anand & Batzaya Advocates (Mongolia); 
Neda Ivovic, University of Donja Gorica (Montenegro); Zohra Hasnaoui and 
Ahmad Hussein, Hasnaoui Law Firm AGIP (Abu-Ghazaleh Intellectual 
Property - Morocco) (Morocco); Carlos de Sousa E Brito, Carlos de Sousa 
E Brito & Associados (Mozambique); Win Win Aye and Khin Wint Maw, 
Kelvin Chia Yangon Limited (Myanmar); Willem Bodenstein and Mike 
Bottger, Lorentz Angula Incorporated (Namibia); Arthur Salomons, 
University of Amsterdam (Netherlands); Roger Tennant Fenton, Southern 
Cross Chambers (New Zealand); Minerva Bellorin R., Diogenes E, 
Velasquez V, and Mazziel A Rivera Núñez, Aczalaw (Nicaragua); Lydia 
Rosoanirina and Adrien Rangira, John W Ffooks & Co (Niger); Joseph 
Eimunjeze, Udo Udoma & Belo-Osagie (Nigeria); Jan-Ove Fæ rstad, 
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University of Bergen (Norway); Alastair R. Neale and Ruqaya Al 
Khanbashi, Jihad Al Taie Law Office (Oman); Zaid Al Khattab, Talala Abu 
Ghazaleh & Co (Oman); Ahsan Zahir Rizvi, Rizvi, Isa, Afridi & Angell 
(Pakistan); Ivette E Martínez, Patton Moreno & Asvat (Panama); Ramon 
Varela, Morgan & Morgan (Panama); Esteban Burt, Peroni Sosa Tellechea 
Burt & Narvaja (Paraguay); Manuel Villa-García Noriega, Estudio Olaechea 
S Civil de RL (Perù); Eduardo de los Angeles, Romulo Mabanta 
Buenaventura Sayoc & de los Angeles (Philippines); Jerzy Andrzej 
Pisuliński and Michal Kucka, Jagiellonian University in Cracow (Poland); 
Margarida Costa Andrade, University of Coimbra (Portugal); Monica 
Jardim, University of Coimbra (Portugal); Thelma Rivera, Goldman, 
Antonetti & Córdova, PSC (Puerto Rico); Ejan Mackaay, Université de 
Montréal (Quebec, Canada); Cristina Bolea and Vlad Peligrad, Clifford 
Chance Badea SCA (Romania); Magdalena Raducanu, Salans Moore si 
Asociatii SCPA (Romania); Sergey Strembelev and Natalia Dialektova, 
Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners Law Offices (Russia); Vannissa 
Rakotonirina and Adrien Rangira, John W Ffooks & Co (Rwanda and 
Senegal); Stephen Matthews and Abdullah Al Saab, The Law Office of 
Mohanned S Al-Rasheed (Saudi Arabia); Andrew Steven, University of 
Edinburgh (Scotland, UK); Nataša Lalatović Đorđević, Moravčević 
Vojnović and partners in cooperation with Schoenherr (Serbia); Žarko S. 
Borovčanin, Jankovic, Popovic & Mitic od (Serbia); Oredola Martyn, Clas 
Legal (Sierra Leone); Yi-Ling Teo, Gateway Law Corporation (Singapore); 
Katarína Čechová, Čechová & Partners (Slovak Republic); Tomaz Kerestes, 
University of Maribor (Slovenia); Athol Gordon, Bowman Gilfillan 
Attorneys (South Africa); Chun-Wook Hyun, Kim & Chang (South Korea); 
Carlos Díez Soto, Technical University of Cartagena, and Isabel González 
Pacanowska, University of Murcia (Spain); John Wilson, John Wilson 
Partners, Attorneys at Law & Notaries Public (Sri Lanka); Martin Lilja, 
Salzburg University (Sweden); Bénédict Foëx, University of Geneva 
(Switzerland); Deema Abu Zulaikha, Tag-Legal Syria (Syria); Kamanga 
Wilbert Kapinga, CRB Africa Legal (Tanzania); Cynthia M Pornavalai, 
Tilleke & Gibbins (Thailand); Phisit Dejchaiyasak, Weerawong, Chinnavat 
and Peangpanor Limited (Thailand); Stephen A Singh, Johnson, Camacho 
and Singh (Trinidad and Tobago); Issam Mokni, Ferchiou & Associés 
(Tunisia); Yesim Atamer, Ece Bas, Başak Başoğlu, Meliha Sermin Paksoy, 
and Pinar Yazici, Istanbul Bilgi University (Turkey); Emmanuel Kasimbazi, 
Makerere University (Uganda); Oleg Boichuk, Magisters (Ukraine); Rami 
Abdellatif and Mohammed Kamran, Al Tamimi Advocates & Legal 
Consultants (United Arab Emirates); Steven Walt, University of Virginia 
School of Law (United States); Pedro J Montano, Universidad de la 
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República and Scelza & Montano (Uruguay); Juan Enrique Aigster and José 
Alberto Ramírez, Hoet Pelaez Castillo & Duque Abogados (Venezuela); 
Dang The Duc and Tuong Tran, Indochine Council (Vietnam); Sydney 
Chisenga, Corpus Legal practitioners (Zambia); Peter Lloyd, Gill, 
Godlonton & Gerrans (Zimbabwe). 
D.  LIST OF COUNTRIES AND COUNTRY CODES 
TABLE 10.  List of Countries and Country Codes 
Country Code Country Code Country Code 
Albania ALB Honduras HND Pakistan PAK 
Angola AGO Hong Kong HKG Panama PAN 
Argentina ARG Hungary HUN Paraguay PRY 
Armenia ARM India IND Peru PER 
Australia AUS Indonesia IDN Philippines PHL 
Austria AUT Iran IRN Poland POL 
Azerbaijan AZE Ireland IRL Portugal PRT 
Bahrain BHR Israel ISR Puerto Rico PRI 
Bangladesh BGD Italy ITA Romania ROU 
Belarus BLR Jamaica JAM Russia RUS 
Belgium BEL Japan JPN Rwanda RWA 
Belize BLZ Jordan JOR Saudi Arabia SAU 
Bolivia BOL Kazakhstan KAZ Scotland SCT 
Bosnia and 
Herzegowina BIH Kenya KEN Senegal SEN 
Brazil BRA Kosovo KOS Serbia SCG 
Bulgaria BGR Kuwait KWT Sierra Leone SLE 
Burkina Faso BFA 
Kyrgyz 
Republic KGZ Singapore SGP 
Burundi BDI Latvia LVA 
Slovak 
Republic SVK 
Cameroon CMR Lesotho LSO Slovenia SVN 
Chile CHL Lithuania LTU South Africa ZAF 
China CHN Luxembourg LUX South Korea KOR 
Colombia COL Macedonia MKD Spain ESP 
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Costa Rica CRI Malaysia MYS Sri Lanka LKA 
Cote d'Ivoire CIV Mali MLI Sweden SWE 
Croatia HRV Malta MLT Switzerland CHE 
Cyprus CYP Mauritius MUS Syria SYR 
Czech 
Republic CZE Mexico MEX Tanzania TZA 
Denmark DNK Moldova MDA Thailand THA 
Dominican 
Republic DOM Mongolia MNG 
Trinidad & 
Tobago TTO 
Ecuador ECU Montenegro MNE Tunisia TUN 
Egypt EGY Morocco MAR Turkey TUR 
El Salvador SLV Mozambique MOZ Uganda UGA 
Estonia EST Myanmar MMR Ukraine UKR 
Ethiopia ETH Namibia NAM 
United Arab 
Emirates ARE 
Finland FIN Netherlands NLD United States USA 
France FRA 
New 
Zealand NZL Uruguay URY 
Georgia GEO Nicaragua NIC Venezuela VEN 
Germany DEU Niger NER Vietnam VNM 




Great Britain GBR 
Northern 
Ireland NIR Zambia ZMB 
Greece GRC Norway NOR Zimbabwe ZWE 
Guatemala GTM Oman OMN   
 
